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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court failed to properly define the 
charge of "theft" and whether the inadequately defined instruction 
precluded the jury from considering lesser offenses, charges 
pertinent to Mr. Boren's theory of the case. "Because an appeal 
challenging the refusal to give jury instructions presents questions 
of law only, we grant no particular deference to the trial court's 
rulings." Carpet Barn v. State, 786 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah App. 1990); 
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 798 (Utah 1991). 
2. Whether the jury instructions created an impermissible 
mandatory rebuttable presumption? See standard of review for issue 
one; accord State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992) (on 
"matter[s] of statutory interpretation[,] . . . we review the trial 
court's ruling for correctness and give no deference to its 
conclusions"); Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 
(Utah 1989) ("A trial court's legal conclusions are accorded no 
particular deference"). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for theft, 
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404, in 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, presiding. Following a two 
day trial, a jury convicted Mr. Boren of the above charge on February 
10, 1993. (R 212). Shortly thereafter, Mr. Boren moved for a new 
trial and a certificate of probable cause. (R 219-54). His motions 
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were denied. 
On April 16, 1993, following entry of judgment for the next 
lower category of offense, the trial court sentenced Mr. Boren to an 
indeterminate term of zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison 
together with an order to pay $150.00 in restitution. (R 262-65). 
The court then stayed the prison sentence and placed him on 
probation for 36 months. (R 265-66). 
Other statements pertinent to the proceedings, including 
motions made before, during, and after the trial, are more fully 
discussed below. The relevant motions are attached in Addendum B 
and incorporated herein. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts are contained in the body of the brief, 
intertwined in the legal analysis regarding the jury instructions. 
In brief, Lyla Shore, a friend of Jeb Clark, had borrowed 
Mr. Clark's car on April 18, 1992. (R 443, p.105). Sometime that 
day after 3:00 or 4:00 p.m., Lyla noticed the car was missing. 
(R 443, p. 106). The next morning, at approximately 8:30 a.m., Jeb, 
Lyla, and her son Bryan located the car at the residence of 
Mr. Boren's ex-wife. (R 443, p.106-08). 
Ron Boren was owed money for repairing and fixing the car. 
(R 366-67); (R 443, pp.92, 94). When Jeb, Lyla, and Bryan 
confronted Ron, they told him to hand over the ignition switch, a 
device used to start the car. (R 443, p.113). Ron complied. He 
threw the device and ran away. (R 443, p.113). Bryan caught him, 
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punched him, and the incident ended. (R 443, p.110). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it refused to properly define 
the charge of theft. As the courts below already had recognized, 
the case ultimately hinged on the element of intent. The "purpose 
to deprive" instruction, however, was inadequately defined. The 
distinction between "temporary" deprivation and "permanent" 
deprivation never was made clear to the jury. Due to the flawed 
wording of the instructions, the jury lacked the ability to 
distinguish and choose between the lesser included offenses and the 
temporary nature of the alleged deprivation. 
The defective instructions also contained an impermissible 
mandatory presumption against Mr. Boren on the critical intent 
determination. The involved jury instruction mirrored the 
corresponding statute. While such authority was an appropriate 
point of legal reference for the trial court to use in deciding 
whether the case should be submitted to the jury, the same authority 
should not have been used by the jury in its fact finding 
determinations. The wording of the statute improperly allowed the 
burden of proof to shift to Mr. Boren. The trial court erred in not 
correcting the defects in a manner consistent with Mr. Boren's 
requests. 
- 4 -
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURTS REFUSAL TO CORRECT THE INSTRUCTIONS 
PREVENTED THE JURY FROM FINDING A "TEMPORARY" (AS 
OPPOSED TO "PERMANENT") INTENT TO DEPRIVE 
The case at bar presents a slight variation of the issue 
presented in State v. Chesnut, 621 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980). The issue 
here is whether the trial court's failure to properly define the 
charge of "theft" precluded the jury from considering lesser 
offenses, charges pertinent to Mr. Boren's theory of the case. 
The theft definition includes a purpose to "permanently" 
deprive another of his or her property. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-401(3)(a). The court below, however, refused to insert the 
adverb, "permanently", before the word, "deprive", in the designated 
theft instructions. (R 383-84) (copies of jury instructions #9, 
#10, & 11 are attached in Addendum C). Such an insertion was 
critical to distinguishing theft from the lesser offenses. 
Like Mr. Boren, the defendant in Chesnut was tried and 
convicted "of theft of an operable motor vehicle in violation of 
Section 76-6-404 and 76-6-412(a)(ii)." Compare (R 212), with 
Chesnut, 621 P.2d at 1231. "Under [defendant Chesnut and 
Mr. Boren#s] theory of the facts as set forth in the evidence there 
was a rational basis to acquit him of the crime of theft and convict 
him of the lesser included offense of joyriding[.]" See Chesnut, 
621 P.2d at 1232 (the "joyriding" statute referred to in Chesnut is 
now encompassed by Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-la-1311(l); 41-la-1314(1)); 
cf. (R 225) (in Mr. Boren's case, Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1311(l) 
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[unauthorized control over a motor vehicle, a class A misdemeanor] 
and Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1314(1) [unauthorized control over a 
motor vehicle, a third degree felony] had potential application). 
Disputed in the Chesnut case was whether the defendant 
intended to permanently deprive the owner of his property, a 
motorcycle. While the jury had apparently found such an intent, on 
appeal the supreme court reversed because the defendant's theory of 
temporary deprivation was omitted from the jury instructions. 
Chesnut, 621 P.2d at 1231-32. "[T]he issue of defendant's intent 
should [have been] submitted to the trier of fact with the requested 
instruction on the lesser included offense of joyriding." Id. 
at 1232. 
Such an instruction [on lesser included offenses] may 
properly be refused if the prosecution has met its 
burden of proof on the greater offense, and there is 
no evidence tending to reduce the greater offense. If 
there be any evidence, however slight, on any 
reasonable theory of the case under which defendant 
might be convicted of a lesser included offense, the 
trial court must, if requested, give an appropriate 
instruction. 
Chesnut, 621 P.2d at 1232 (original emphasis added by the court). 
At trial, defendant Chesnut "testified his intention was to 
return the motorcycle after he had ridden for an hour or so." Id. 
at 1230. The jury, however, never received the opportunity to 
consider Chesnut's theory of temporary deprivation and the lesser 
included offense of joyriding. The supreme court remanded the case 
for a new trial. Id. 
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Similarly, in the case at bar the issue of intent was 
inadequately considered by the jury. The trial court's refusal to 
"insert the word 'permanently' before the word deprive" was vital to 
the "temporary" deprivation issue, (R 383-84), especially because of 
the marginal nature of the evidence. (R 345-46). 
Jeb Clark's car was missing for no more than 18 hours. See 
(R 443, p.134); (R 443, p.106-08) (prosecution witness Lyla Shore 
indicated that the car was missing sometime after 3:00 or 4:00 p.m. 
on April 18, 1992, and located the next day around 8:30 a.m.); cf. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-la-1311(l); 41-la-1314(1) (unauthorized control 
of a vehicle for less than 24 hours may be a class A misdemeanor or 
a third degree felony). 
When Jeb Clark (Lyla Shore, and her son, Bryan), confronted 
Ron Boren, they told Ron to hand over the ignition switch, a device 
used to start the car. (R 443, p.113). Boren immediately complied. 
He threw the device over a fence and ran away. (R 443, p.113). 
Even though Mr. Boren did not politely hand over the ignition switch 
to Jeb Clark, the trial court recognized that Ron had returned 
control of the car back to the owner. (R 443, p.113-14). 
The temporary nature of the deprivation and the 
applicability of lesser offenses already had been acknowledged by 
the court during preliminary discussions over the jury instructions: 
[The State]: [Mr. Boren's counsel] has [proposed a] 
Class A [jury instruction], and I've done the third 
degree [instruction] assuming that you [the court] are 
going to give that, and . . . the way I read it is the 
Defendant would have to have brought that car back 
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within 24 hours to qualify for Class A, and he didn't 
do that. 
[Counsel for Mr. Boren]: That's not what the law 
says. . . . [W]hat the law says is it's a third 
degree. If you fail to do that, it's a Class A, if 
you exercise unauthorized control with intent to 
temporarily deprive. That's the statutory limit. 
[The State]: What I'm reading, third degree to 
exercise, if the person does not return the motor 
vehicle to the owner, lawful custodian, within 24 
hours and he didn't do — 
THE COURT: Wellf I think he did. He fMr. Boren] gave 
them the key back, the ignition, when they told him to. 
[The State]: Well, at any rate, that's what I'm 
weighing it to. 
THE COURT: Those are arguable facts for you. That's 
the jury's. All right. 
(R 443, p.133-34); (R 388). Since Ron Boren "gave them the key 
back, the ignition, when they told him to[,]" (R 443, p.134), "there 
was a rational basis to acquit him of the crime of theft and convict 
him of the lesser included offense . . . " Chesnut, 621 P.2d 
at 1232. 
The evidence presented at the preliminary hearing was no 
better and even then the question of intent had been the key issue: 
THE COURT: Okay. I'm prepared to make a ruling and 
I'll tell you that I think that this case definitely 
does hinge on the intent to deprive issues. I'm going 
to preface my finding with the fact that the level of 
proof at a preliminary hearing, as you know, is very 
low. Probable cause is a low threshold and I believe 
the State has met that threshold of probable 
cause. • • • 
I will tell you, also, as an aside, I think the 
evidence is pretty thin. I think it meets the 
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threshold of probable cause but, [Counsel for 
Mr. Boren], I think the points you've raised are 
valid. And I'm frankly telling you I think it's a 
close call, the call I've made. And I'm basing it on 
what I consider to be a low threshold. 
(R 345-46). 
Despite the questionable nature of the State's evidence on 
the "purpose to deprive" element, the trial court refused to "insert 
the word 'permanently' before the word deprive." (R 383). The 
court reasoned, "the definition of purpose to deprive is given in 
instruction ten, and it uses the word permanently, etc., so I will 
not change that." (R 384).1 
However, the "purpose to deprive" definition lists three 
independent meanings. (R 194). "Permanently" modifies only one of 
the three alternative definitions. (R 194); (R 194; 432-34) (in 
response to the jury's request for clarification, the trial court 
explained that "purpose to deprive" contains three independent 
alternative meanings and it also penciled in "a", "b", and "c" and 
underscored "or" to emphasize their separate nature). Hence, the 
1. "Purpose to deprive" is defined in Instruction #10. 
The instruction, prior to the court's alterations, read: 
"Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious 
objective to withhold property permanently or for so 
extended a period or to use under circumstances that a 
substantial portion of its economic value, or of the 
use and benefit thereof, would be lost, or to restore 
the property only upon payment of a reward or other 
compensation, or to dispose of the property under 
circumstances that make it unlikely that the owner 
will recover it. 
(R 194) . 
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jury was allowed to consider either one of the two other 
alternatives, both of which were not modified by the adverb, 
"permanently."2 See infra Point II (one alternative definition for 
"purpose to deprive" was independently flawed). 
The trial court's denial of Mr. Boren's requested 
modifications was, in substance, the same type of denial by the 
trial court in Chesnut. While lesser offenses were included in the 
instant action, unlike their complete omission in Chesnut, in both 
cases "permanent" versus "temporary" deprivation was the critical 
issue not considered by the jury. The plain language of the 
instructions here prevented the jury from considering the lesser 
2. A single flawed alternative theory in a criminal trial 
invalidates the entire verdict: 
In a civil case, we will affirm a general verdict so 
long as there is one legally valid theory among those 
upon which the case went to the jury and sufficient 
evidence to support a verdict on that theory. 
However, in a criminal case the rule is to the 
contrary. . . . [A] general verdict of guilty cannot 
stand if the State's case was premised on the elements 
of the crime and any one of those theories is flawed 
or lacks the requisite evidentiary foundation. In 
such circumstances, it is impossible to determine 
whether the jury agreed unanimously on all of the 
elements of a valid and evidentially supported theory 
of the elements of the crime. 
State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1159 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added 
and citations omitted); cf. State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 
1993) (per curiam) ("Since the jury was allowed to consider the 
depraved indifference alternative, as well as those states of mind 
described in subsections (a) and (b) . . . defendant is entitled to 
a new trial"); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 526 (1979) ("it 
has long been settled that when a case is submitted to the jury on 
alternative theories, the unconstitutionality of any of the theories 
requires that the conviction [or verdict] be set aside"). 
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offenses in the same manner as if they had never been given. See 
(R 195-97) (lesser charges could not be considered until after the 
initial determination of the theft charge); Parker v. Randolph, 442 
U.S. 62, 73 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.) ("A critical assumption 
underlying that system [of trial by jury] is that juries will follow 
the instructions given them by the trial judge") quoted in Francis 
v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324-35 n.9 (1985) (Brennan, J.); accord 
(R 229, 230, 232) (juror affidavit explaining that the jury 
obediently followed the instructions: "I and others felt that 
because of the instructions, a lesser charge could not be considered 
unless the accused was 'not guilty of the greater offense") 
(attached in Addendum D). 
In fact, in Chesnut, in addition to having arguably enough 
evidence to support the second degree felony theft charge, see 621 
P.2d at 1231, the jury also considered only the permanent 
deprivation alternative. Id. at 1231 n.l. Thus, unlike the present 
situation where the applicability of "permanent" deprivation never 
was made clear, (R 194), the Chesnut jury specifically focused on 
whether the defendant had a purpose to permanently deprive. 621 
P.2d at 1231 n.l. Despite the jury's finding of the requisite 
intent, the supreme court held that the trial court should not have 
rejected defendant Chesnut's theory of temporary deprivation. Id. 
at 1232. 
The Chesnut principles apply to Mr. Boren's situation with 
even greater force because of the unclear instructions and the 
availability of three independent alternative "purpose to deprive" 
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definitions. (R 194; 432-34).3 Since the adverb, "permanently", 
was not inserted before the word deprive, the jury was allowed to 
find a permanent deprivation or a temporary deprivation. In other 
words, theft could have been established under either type of intent 
and the jury was left with no reason to consider the lesser 
charges.4 The trial court's ruling was in error. 
POINT II 
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
MANDATORY PRESUMPTION 
"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
7protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime 
with which he is charged.7" Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313 
(1985) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)). "This 
'bedrock, "axiomatic and elementary" [constitutional] principle7 
3. Cf. State v. Ash, 23 Utah 2d 14, 456 P.2d 154 (1969) 
(unlike the failure in the case at bar to specifically instruct the 
jury on permanent deprivation, "defendant [Ash] could not have been 
prejudiced by a failure to have the jury consider whether his intent 
was to deprive the owner of the use of his car temporarily because 
the court clearly told the jury to find the defendant not guilty if 
they failed to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to 
deprive the owner permanently of the use of the car") (emphasis 
added by the court). 
4. The lower court's denial of Mr. Boren7s requests 
created an "all or nothing" theft instruction in a manner already 
condemned in the analogous context of a court refusing to give a 
lesser included offense. See State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 
(Utah 1986) ("This is exactly the sort of forced choice that lesser 
included offense instructions are designed to avoid, and exactly the 
choice that the jury would not have had to make if [the lesser 
included offense] instruction had been give"). 
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prohibits the State from using evidentiary presumptions in a jury 
charge that have the effect of relieving the State of its burden of 
persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of a 
crime." Franklin, 471 U.S. at 313 (citations omitted). 
The issue here is whether the jury instructions relieved 
the State of its burden of proof on the critical element of intent. 
Jury instruction #10 contains the contested language. It stated in 
pertinent part: 
"Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious 
objective to withhold property permanently or for so 
extended a period or to use under circumstances that a 
substantial portion of its economic value, or of the 
use and benefit thereof, would be lost, or to restore 
the property only upon payment of a reward or other 
compensation, or to dispose of the property under 
circumstances that make it unlikely that the owner 
will recover it. 
(R 194) (emphasis added). 
"The analysis is straightforward. 'The threshold inquiry 
in ascertaining the constitutional analysis applicable to this kind 
of jury instruction is to determine the nature of the presumption it 
describes.,H Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1985) 
(quoting Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514 (1979)). 
A mandatory presumption instructs the jury that it 
must infer the presumed fact if the State proves 
certain predicate facts. A mandatory presumption may 
be either conclusive or rebuttable. A conclusive 
presumption removes the presumed element from the case 
once the State have proven the predicate facts giving 
rise to the presumption. A rebuttable presumption 
does not remove the presumed element from the case but 
nevertheless requires the jury to find the presumed 
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element unless the defendant persuades the jury that 
such a finding is unwarranted. 
Franklin, 471 U.S. at 314 & n.2.5 
Jury instruction #10 created a mandatory presumption. 
Instead of requiring the State to prove a "purpose to deprive", the 
instruction only required the State to prove a predicate fact. 
While a jury may infer a "purpose to deprive" upon proof that "the 
property [would be restored] only upon payment of a reward or other 
compensation . . . ," a jury also should be able to reject such an 
inference. Instruction #10, however, precluded such a rejection 
because it simply equated a "purpose to deprive" with the 
corresponding predicate fact. The predicate fact was essentially 
prima facie evidence of the "purpose to deprive" element. Once the 
State established the predicate fact, the burden shifted to 
Mr. Boren to show that he did not possess the criminal intent. 
State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452 (Utah 1987), lends analogous 
guidance in this regard. The opinion carefully distinguished 
between an unconstitutional presumption and a permissible inference. 
The following language contains an improper presumption: "Possession 
5. Two sentences in Franklin focused on the element of 
intent. "The acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are 
presumed to be the product of the person's will, but the presumption 
may be rebutted. A person of sound mind and discretion is presumed 
to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts but the 
presumption may be rebutted." Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 
315 (1985). Notwithstanding the Georgia Supreme Court's 
interpretation of "this language as creating no more than a 
permissive inference. . . ," the United States Supreme Court 
reversed because of "what a reasonable juror could have understood 
the charge as meaning." Id. at 315-16. 
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of property recently stolen when no satisfactory explanation of such 
possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the 
person in possession stole the property." See id. at 456 (citing 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1)). A slight modification, however, 
corrects the presumption: "Under the law of the State of Utah, 
possession of property recently stolen, when a person in possession 
fails to make a satisfactory explanation of such possession, is a 
fact from which you may infer that the person in possession stole 
such property." 745 P.2d at 456. 
Unlike the modified Johnson instruction which enabled the 
jury to infer, instruction #10 left the jury with no choice other 
than to presume a "purpose to deprive" upon proof of the predicate 
fact. Using the predicate fact to infer criminal intent is proper; 
however, the jury should not have been instructed that the predicate 
fact "means" intent. (R 194). The lower court failed to 
distinguish between authority which may be considered by the court 
and instructions which must not be given to the jury. Compare State 
v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321, 326-27 (Utah 1985) ("the statute provides 
a standard [for the court] by which to determine the sufficiency of 
the evidence for submitting the case to the jury"), with id. at 327 
(for situations like the case at bar, "the statutory language should 
not be used in any form in instructing juries in criminal cases"). 
Jury Instructions #9 & #11 also contained and incorporated 
the unconstitutional intent definition. (R 193, 195). The jury 
instructions were impermissibly defective. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this & day of October, 1993. 
3 
OtJAL R NA D S. FUJINO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that I have caused eight 
copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102, and two copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this ft day of October, 1993. 
£• 
RONALD S. VFUT/INO 
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DELIVERED by 
this day of October, 1993. 
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ADDENDUM A 
41-1-109. Unlawful control over vehicles — Penalties — 
Effect of prior consent — Accessory or accom-
plice. 
(1) Any person who exercises unauthorized control over a vehicle, not his 
own, without the consent of the owner or lawful custodian and with intent to 
temporarily deprive the owner or lawful custodian of possession of the vehicle, 
is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(2) An offense under this section is a third degree felony if the actor does 
not return the vehicle to the owner or lawful custodian within 24 hours after 
the exercise of unauthorized control. 
(3) 'Die consent of the owner or legal custodian of a vehicle to its control by 
the actor is not in any case presumed or implied because of the owner's or 
legal custodian's consent on a previous occasion to the control of the vehicle by 
the same or a different person. 
(4) Any person who assists in, or is a party or accessory to or an accomplice 
in, an unauthorized taking or driving is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
41-la-1311. Unlawful control over motor vehicles, trailers,, 
or semitrailers — Penalties — Effect of prior con-
sent — Accessory or accomplice. 
(1) It is a class A misdemeanor for a person to exercise unauthorized control 
over a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer not his own, without the consent of 
the owner or lawful custodian and with intent to temporarily deprive the 
owner or lawful custodian of possession of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semi-
trailer. 
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of a motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer to its control by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied 
because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a previous occasion to 
the control of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer by the same or a differ-
ent person. 
(3) Any person who assists in, or is a party or accessory to or an accomplice 
in, an unauthorized taking or driving is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
41-la-1314. Third degree felony to exercise unauthorized 
control for extended time. 
(1) It is a third degree felony to exercise unauthorized control over a motoi 
vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer if the person does not return the motor vehicle 
trailer, or semitrailer to the owner or lawful custodian within 24 hours after 
the exercise of unauthorized control. 
. (2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of a motor vehicle, trailer, oi 
semitrailer to its control by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied 
because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a previous occasion to 
the control of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer by the same or a differ-
ent person. 
THEFT 
76-6-401. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this part 
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible 
and intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and 
birds, written instruments or other writings representmg or embodying 
rights concerning real or personal property, labor, services, or otherwise 
containing anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public utility 
nature such as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and 
trade secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific or tech-
nical information, design, process, procedure, formula or mvention which 
the owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him. 
(2) "Obtain" means, m relation to property, to bring about a transfer of 
possession or of some other legally recognized interest m property, 
whether to the obtainer or another, in relation to labor or services, to 
secure performance thereof; and m relation to a trade secret, to make any 
facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction. 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period 
or to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its 
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other 
compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances that make it 
unlikely that the owner will recover it 
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. 
A person commits theft if be obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
76-6-412- Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for 
treble damages against receiver of stolen prop-
ertv» 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be pun-
Ta) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services exceeds $1,000, 
U) pro^rty stolen is a firearm or an operable ,motor vehicle; 
(Ui) aetoVis armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft 
°
F(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
ADDENDUM B 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT (5141) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Plaintiff, : 
v* : 
RONALD L. BOREN, : Case No. 921901604FS 
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Defendant. : 
The defendant, RONALD L. BOREN, respectfully moves this 
Court to grant him a new trial in the above-numbered case pursuant 
to the provisions of Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(1992) . 
This Motion is made on the grounds that the jury was 
substantially misled by the jury instructions. See attached 
Questionnaire response of juror Garth N. Peterson. The jury 
instructions misled the jury by defining the offense of Automobile 
Theft, a second-degree felony under §§76-6-401, 76-6-404 and 
76-6-412, Utah Code Ann. (1990), in a manner that is 
indistinguishable from the lesser offense of Unauthorized Control 
Over a Motor Vehicle, a third-degree felony under §41-la-1314, Utah 
Code Ann. (Supp. 1992), and a class A misdemeanor under §41-la-1311, 
Jp-
00225 
Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1992) (see attached jury instructions 9, 10, 
11, 12, 13 and 14). 
Further, instructing the jury on the provisions of 
§76-6-401(3)(b), Utah Code Ann. (1990) (definition of "purpose to 
deprive), created a mandatory presumption of criminal intent on the 
basis of mere conduct. Defendant objected to so instructing the 
jury prior to trial on the same grounds. See attached Motion in 
Limine Not to Instruct the Jury on §76-6-401(3)(b). 
DATED this 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT 
Attorney at Law 
• J 6 c y ^ 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 this /<7 day of -&fH?ii, 1993, 
C'-*X<* 
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ROGER K. SCOWCROFT (5141) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
RONALD L. BOREN, 
Defendant. 
ORDER FOR NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 921901604FS 
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Based on Motion of defendant and for good cause shown, it 
is hereby ordered that the conviction previously entered in the 
above-numbered case be vacated and that a new trial be held in the 
above-numbered case. 
IT IS SO ORDERED this day of April, 1993. 
HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Third District Court 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 this / ' day of April, 1993 
,,<r. '--°*fs 
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/'7 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 24 
Prosecutorial misconduct. 
Prosecutorial misconduct before trial was 
grounds for a new trial, not an arrest of judg-
ment, even though defendant's motion for ar-
rest of judgment or in the alternative for a new 
trial was made before imposition of sentence. 
State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976 (Utah Ct App. 
1988). 
Variance between charge and verdict. 
Although the verdict form signed by the jury 
foreman stated that the defendant was guilty 
of "forcible sexual assault" and the information 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. JUT. 2d Criminal 
Law §§ 520 to 524. 
C.J.S. — 23A CJ.S. Criminal Law § 1453 et 
seq. 
ANALYSIS 
Absence of witness. 
Affidavits of jurors. 
Bias or prejudice of jurors. 
Discretion of court. 
Evidence m support of motion. 
Misconduct of jury. 
Motion to reopen preliminary hearing. 
—Dismissal of charges. 
Newly discovered evidence. 
Prosecutorial misconduct. 
Verdict supported by evidence. 
Cited. 
Absence of witness. 
Where the evidence was discovered before 
trial but the witness was absent, not only must 
diligence have been shown in attempting to ob-
had charged the defendant with "aggravated 
sexual assault," the variance did not justify the 
granting of a motion to arrest judgment on the 
basis of uncertainty as to what the jury in-
tended; an error on the jury verdict form does 
not create uncertainty per se, and there was no 
reason to doubt that the jury intended to find 
the defendant guilty as charged. State v. Gen-
try, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987). 
Cited in State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 
(Utah 1989). 
AXJL — Coram nobis on ground of other's 
confession to crime, 46 A.L.R.4th 468. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «» 974 to 
976. 
tain the testimony of such witness, but an ap-
plication must have been made to obtain a 
postponement of the trial so as to give opportu-
nity to obtain such witness or evidence before 
defendant might avail himself of a motion for a 
new trial on the ground of newly discovered 
evidence. State v. Weaver, 78 Utah 555, 6 P.2d 
167 (1931). 
Defendant was not entitled to a new trial to 
produce a witness who was unavailable at trial 
where witness' absence was not due to any 
error or impropriety at trial, but was due to 
attendance at an out-of-town convention, and 
defendant did not ask for a new trial date or a 
continuance to accommodate the witness" cal-
endar. State v. Gehnng, 694 P.2d 599 (Utah 
1984). 
Affidavits of jurors. 
Verdict of guilty of larceny of sheep which 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Rule 24. Motion for new trial. 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant 
a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which 
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The 
motion shall be accompanied by afiBdavits or evidence of the essential facts in 
support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure afiBdavits or 
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it 
deems reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of 
sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day 
period. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no 
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned 
either in evidence or in argument. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
403 
INSTRUCTION NO. <={ 
Under the law of the State of Utah, a person is guilty of 
theft if that person obtains or exercises unauthorized control 
over the property of another with a purpose to deprive the owner 
thereof. 
00233 
INSTRUCTION NO. , ffo 
"Property" means anything of value, including tangible 
personal property. 
"Obtain* means, in relation to property, to bring about a 
transfer of possession or of some other legally recognized 
interest in property, whether to the obtained or another. 
"Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious objective 
to withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or 
to use under circumstances that a substantial portion of its 
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be 
lost, or to restore the property only upon payment of a reward 
or other compensation, or to dispose of the property under 
circumstances that maJce it unlikely that the owner will recover 
it. 
An "operable motor vehicle" is a motor vehicle capable of 
being driven. 
"On or about" includes any day that closely approximates or 
is near the day alleged in the Information. 
0023^ 
INSTRUCTION NO. \\ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Ronald L. Boren, of 
the crime of Theft as charged in count I of the information, you 
must believe from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable 
doubt each and every one of the following elements of that 
offense: 
1. That on or about the 18th day of April, 1992, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Ronald L. Boren, 
obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of 
another; 
2. That the defendant did so with the purpose to deprive 
the owner thereof; and 
3. That the property^as an operable motor vehicle. 
If after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case you are convinced of the truth of each and every one of 
the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of the offense of Theft as charged in 
count I of the information. If, on the other hand, you are not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 
foregoing elements, then you must consider the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant with respect to the offense of Unlawful Taking 
Of A Vehicle, a lesser included offense of count I. 
00233 
INSTRUCTION NO. l£t 
The law permits a jury to find an accused guilty of amy 
lesser offense which is necessarily included in the crime charged 
in the information whenever such a course in consistent with the 
facts found by the jury from the evidence in the case and with 
the law as stated by the Court. 
If the jury should find the accused "not guilty" of the 
greater offense as charged in the information and defined in 
these instructions, then the jury should proceed to determine the 
guilt or innocence of the accused as to any lesser offense which 
is necessarily included in the offense charged. 
0 0 ? 3 6 
INSTRUCTION NO- \h 
Before you can convict the defendant, Ronald L. Boren, of 
the offense of Unlawful Taking Of A Vehicle, a Third Degree 
Felony, a lesser included offense in count I of the information, 
you must have found that the evidence fails to establish one or 
more of the elements of Theft beyond a reasonable doubt, and you 
must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, each and 
every one of the following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 18th day of April, 1992, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Ronald L. Boren, 
intentionally or knowingly exercised control over a vehicle; 
2. That the defendant exercised such control with the 
purpose to temporarily deprive the owner or lawful, custodian of 
the possession so such vehicle; 
3- That the vehicle was not the defendant's own; 
4. That the owner or lawful custodian did not consent to 
nor authorize the defendant to exercise such control over the 
vehicle; and 
5. That the defendant did not return the vehicle to the 
owner or lawful custodian within 24 hours after the exercise of 
such unauthorized control. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of the offense of Unlawful Taking 
Of A Vehicle, a lesser included offense in count I of the 
information. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond 
oo 
a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, 
then you must find the defendant not guilty of count I. 
00233 
INSTRUCTION NO. A 
The offense of Unlawful Control over a Motor Vehicle 
is a lesser included offense within the charged offense of 
Theft of a Motor Vehicle* 
Before you may convict the defendant of the crime of 
Unlawful Control Over A Motor Vehicle the prosecution must 
prove each and every one of the following elements to your 
satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. That on April 18, 1992; 
2. In Salt Lake County; 
3. Ronald L. Boren; 
4. Exercised unauthorized control over a motor 
vehicle of Jeb Clark; 
5. Without the consent of Jeb Clark; 
6. With intent to temporarily deprive the owner of it. 
If the prosecution has failed to prove any one of 
these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find 
Ronald L. Boren not guilty. 
0023? 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT (5141) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt LaJce City, Utah 84111 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RONALD L- BOREN, 
Defendant. 
MOTION IN LIMINE NOT TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON 
§76-6-401(3)(b) 
Case No. 921901604FS 
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
MOTION 
The defendant, RONALD L. BOREN, respectfully moves this 
Court not to instruct the jury according to the provisions of 
§76-6-401(3) (b), Utah Code Ann. (1990). This Motion is made on the 
grounds that so instructing the jury violates constitutional rights 
of due process by creating a mandatory rebuttable presumption of 
criminal intent that shifts the burden of persuasion to the 
defendant to prove his innocence. See U.S. Const, amends. V, XIV; 
Utah Const, art. I, §7; §76-1-501, Utah Code Ann (1990); Francis v. 
Franklin, 86 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985); State v. Turner. 736 P.2d 1043 
(Utah App. 1987) . 
00240 
FACTS 
Plaintiff State alleges that on April 18, 1992, the 
defendant took an operable motor vehicle belonging to his friend, 
Jeb Clark, then told Clark that he would return the car only when 
Clark paid him $20 for his work replacing the car's brakeshoes. 
Clark located the car several hours later in the possession of 
defendant. The defendant ran away, was caught and beaten by Mr. 
Clark's friend, and Mr. Clark repossessed the car. 
ARGUMENT 
On September 11, 1992, defendant was charged with Theft 
under §76-6-404, Utah Code Ann. (1990): 
76-6-404. Theft - Elements 
A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the property 
of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Theft of an operable motor vehicle is classified as a 
second-degree felony under §76-6-412 (1) (a) (ii) , Utah Code Ann. 
(1990) : 
76-6-412. Theft - Classification of offenses -
Action for treble damages against receiver of 
stolen property. 
(1) Theft of property and services as 
provided in this chapter shall be punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if 
the: 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or 
an operable motor vehicle; 
-2 -
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Section 76-6-404 requires that the actor have a "purpose to 
deprive" the owner of the motor vehicle. "Purpose to deprive" is 
defined as follows under §76-6-401(3), Utah Code Ann. (1990): 
76-6-401. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this part: 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the 
conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or for 
so extended a period or to use under such 
circumstances that a substantial portion of 
its economic value, or of the use and benefit 
thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon payment 
of a reward or other compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property under 
circumstances that make it unlikely that the 
owner will recover it. 
This Court should not instruct the jury on the provisions 
of §76-6-401(3) (b) because the statutory language would create a 
mandatory rebuttable presumption on the facts of this case that the 
defendant possessed the requisite mens rea for the offense of Theft 
as charged. A mandatory rebuttable presumption of guilt violates 
constitutional due process in the criminal context because it shifts 
-3 -
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the burden to the defendant to prove his innocence. U.S. Const, 
amends. V, XIV; Utah Const, art. I, I7.1 
This may be an issue of first impression, but Utah courts 
have applied the same reasoning to prohibit instructing juries on 
other statutes. In State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1987) 
the Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction for Burglary 
and Theft because the trial court instructed the jury verbatim 
according to the provisions of §76-6-402(1), Utah Code Ann. (1978): 
76-6-402. Presumptions and defenses. 
The following presumption shall be applicable to 
this part: 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, 
when no satisfactory explanation of such 
possession is made, shall be deemed prima 
facie evidence that the person in possession 
stole the property. 
1
 Section 76-1-501, Utah Code Ann, (1990), codifies these 
constitutional principles: 
76-1-501. Presumption of innocence - "Element of 
the offense" defined. 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is 
presumed to be innocent until each element of the 
offense charged against him is proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the 
defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of 
the offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or 
results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or 
forbidden in the definition of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are 
not elements of the offense but shall be 
established by a preponderance of the evidence. 
-4 -
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The court wrote: 
In this case the trial court instructed the 
jury that possession of recently stolen property, 
in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, is 
"prima facia" evidence of theft by the person in 
possession of the property. Such an instruction, 
nevertheless, fits within the Franklin definition 
of a mandatory rebuttable presumption: "A 
[mandatory] rebuttable presumption ... requires 
the jury to find the element unless the defendant 
persuades the jury that such a finding in 
unwarranted. 
We hold that Chambers and Pacheco are 
dispositive of whether Instructions 17, 18, and 
19 herein are constitutional. Those instructions 
violate due process because they relate to the 
issue of guilt and relieve the State of its 
burden of proof. We reiterate the admonition in 
Chambers that the language of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-402(1) (1978), parroted in Instructions 17 
and 18, should not be used in any form to 
instruct juries in theft and burglary cases. 
State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d at 327. 
Id. at 1045 (quoting State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321, 326 (Utah 
1985), quoting Francis v. Franklin, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)); but see 
State v. Johnson, 745 P. 2d 452, 456 (Utah 1987) (alteration of 
statutory language may cure constitutional defect) . 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons this Court should not instruct the jury 
according to the provisions of §76-6-401(3) (b) because such an 
instruction shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to prove his 
innocence contrary to constitutional due process of law. 
DATED this V^ day of February, 1993 
^^Ja9^ 
ROGER KT^SCOWCROFT/ 
Attorney for Defendant 
-5 - 0024 
MAJELED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt LaJce 
County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt LaJce City, Utah 
84111 this Y day of February, 1993. 
-6 -
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ADDENDDM C 
INSTRUCTION NO, <3 
Under the law of the State of Utah, a person is guilty of 
theft: if that person obtains or exercises unauthorized control 
over the property of another with a purpose to deprive the owner 
thereof. 
0023,? 
INSTRUCTION NO. ltD 
"Property" means anything of value, including tangible 
personal property. 
"Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a 
transfer of possession or of some other legally recognized 
interest in property, whether to the obtained or another. 
"Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious objective 
to withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or 
to use under circumstances that a substantial portion of its 
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof , would be 
lost:, or to restore the property only upon payment of a reward 
or other compensation, or to dispose of the property under 
circumstances that make it unliJcely that the owner will recover 
it. 
An "operable motor vehicle" is a motor vehicle capable of 
being driven. 
"On or about" includes any day that closely approximates or 
is near the day alleged in the Information. 
0023^ 
INSTRUCTION NO. \\ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Ronald L. Boren, of 
the crime of Theft as charged in count I of the information, you 
must believe from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable 
doubt each and every one of the following elements of that 
offense: 
1. That on or about -the 18th day of April, 1992f in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utahr the defendant, Ronald L. Boren, 
obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of 
another; 
2. That the defendant did so with the purpose to deprive 
the owner thereof; and 
3. That the property's an operable motor vehicle* 
If after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case you are convinced of the truth of each and every one of 
the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of the offense of Theft as charged in 
count I of the information. If, on the other hand, you are not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 
foregoing elements, then you must consider the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant with respect to the offense of Unlawful Taking 
Of A Vehicle, a lesser included offense of count I. 
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ADDENDUM D 
Roger K. Scowcroft 
Attorney at Law 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
424 East 500 Southf Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. Do you believe that Jeb Clark owned the Datsun 
automobile that Mr. Boren worked on and later took? 
Yes _x 
No 
No Opinion 
Explain: 
Jeb Clark had possession of the automobile. Whether 
his possession was entirely legal seemed irrelevant 
to the trial. Mr. Clark was not on trial, Mr. Boren 
was. And it seemed clear that the defendant took 
possession of something that wasn't his. 
Do you believe that the defendant, Mr. Boren, intended 
to permanently deprive Jeb Clark of his automobile? 
Yes 
No x 
No Opinion 
Explain: 
I believe Mr. Boren took the property with intent 
to get payment for fixing the brakes. 
002 
Do you believe that the defendant, Mr. Boren, intended 
to temporarily deprive Jeb Clark of his automobile? 
Yes x 
No 
No Opinion 
Explain: 
Same as response to #2 
During your jury deliberations on February 10, 1993, 
the jury requested that the Court make available 
portions of the record. Why? 
Explain: 
One jury member seemed confused about what had 
been stated in court as opposed to what other 
members were saying. 
As I recall, the dispute centered around the 
li^cense plate issue. 
002. 
A copy of the jury instructions is attached to the 
back of this Questionnaire.. During your jury 
deliberations on February 10, 1993, the jury requested 
that the Court explain Instruction No. 10. Did 
Instruction No. 10 confuse you or other members of the 
jury? Why? 
Yes x 
No 
No Opinion 
Explain: 
One jury member was confused. All agreed that the 
defendant had "obtained" unauthorized control of the 
property. All agreed that the defendant took the 
property for "payment", and all agreed that it was 
an "operable motor vehicle." 
One member felt that the "or's" in "purpose to 
deprive" should be read as "and's", meaning that 
all conditions in that paragraph should be met. 
Having heard the testimony at trial, do you believe 
that the defendant, Mr. Boren, had ever been convicted 
of other crimes? Did your belief in that regard 
influence your decision to convict Mr. Boren for Auto 
Theft as charged at trial? 
Yes 
No x 
No Opinion 
Explain: 
Yes, there was testimony about Mr. Boren's previous 
record. It received little or no attention from the 
jury, however, and the testimony did not influence 
my decision. 
00 
Other comments or observations: 
While all felt the defendant was guilty, some 
wanted a lesser charge• I felt that the state 
was making a big deal out of a fairly insignificant 
matter. 
However, I and others felt that because of the 
instructions, a lesser charge could not be con-
sidered unless the accused, was "not guilty of 
the greater offense," (Instructions #12 & #13) 
DATED this *Z& day of Febi 1993-
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